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The Gulf War: A Practitioner's View
W. Hays Parks*
"The laws are silent amidst the clash of arms," or so Cicero is
alleged to have said. Indeed, the term "law of war" has all the ap-
pearances of being one of the great oxymorons of all time. Were one
to follow the actions of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and his mili-
tary forces during their invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the
words of Cicero would seem to ring true. Yet at the same time Colo-
nel Raymond C. Ruppert (U.S.A.), the legal adviser to General H.
Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of United States forces, for the
liberation of Kuwait, has stated that "Desert Storm was the most
legalistic war we've ever fought."1
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm - reflecting the pe-
riods in which the United States and its Coalition partners planned,
prepared for, and executed the liberation of Kuwait - constitute the
greatest deployment of lawyers per capita to a theater of operations,
and the, greatest use of the law (including the law of war) by a na-
tion and its military forces in the history of warfare. Speaking in a
positive tone, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin L.
Powell (U.S.A.) acknowledged that "Lawyers proved invaluable in
the decision-making process" during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm.2
This article will not describe the details of Desert Shield and
Desert Storm. Those have been described in detail in official and
private accounts.' Neither will this article attempt a recitation or
analysis of all of the legal issues that arose in the course of Desert
Shield and Desert Storm. These have been described in the official
Department of Defense report to the Congress on the conduct of the
* Chief, International Law Branch, International and Operational Law Division, and
Special Assistant for Law of War Matters, Office of The Judge Advocate General of the
Army. The contents are the personal opinion of the author and may not necessarily reflect
policy of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or any other agency of the
United States Government.
1. Steven Keeva, Lawyers in the War Room, ABA J. 52, 77 (1991).
2. Id. On the role of lawyers, see also Tom Watson, Law of War on the Rise, Legal
Times XIII, Jan. 21, 1991, at 1.
3. The official account is U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Gulf War (Wash-
ington, April 1992). Two unofficial accounts are N. FRIEDMAN, DESERT VICTORY (1991), and
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, TRIUMPH WITHOUT VICTORY (1992).
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1990-1991 Gulf War. Rather, this article will respond to a question
frequently asked of the author and other uniformed and civilian at-
torneys who practice in an area of the law today known as opera-
tional law: "What is it you do?"
I. Operational Law - How it Began
Operational law is an area of the law born from the U.S. experi-
ence in the Vietnam War. It is an area that encompasses U.S. do-
mestic law, such as laws and directives relating to security assis-
tance, foreign military sales, intelligence oversight, contracts for
goods and services overseas, foreign claims, and authority to negoti-
ate agreements on behalf of the United States. In addition, opera-
tional law entails various facets of public international law, such as
base rights agreements, status of forces agreements, and questions of
sovereignty. However, its heart lies with the heart of military opera-
tions - the application of force on the modern battlefield and the
protection of noncombatants. Thus, operational law is the area of the
law is the area commonly referred to as the law of war.
The law of war is that part of international law that regulates
the conduct of armed hostilities; it is sometimes termed the law of
armed conflict. 5 The law of war encompasses the aspects of interna-
tional law related to issues of when a nation legally may resort to
force, known as jus ad bellun, and the law related to the conduct of
hostilities, known as jus in, bello. The former traditionally lies within
the purview of governments and the national leadership, while the
latter predominantly, but not exclusively, is within the domain of the
military.
The military role in implementing the law of war is affected by
the constitutional authority of the President as the commander-in-
chief of U.S. military forces.' It must be remembered that in a de-
mocracy such as the United States, the military is an instrument for
execution of the foreign policy of the United States. The military
acts on behalf of the people of the United States and their duly-
elected or appointed representatives; it is not an organization that
4. Appendix 0 of the Department of Defense's Conduct of the Gulf War addresses the
following law of war issues: hostages; treatment of civilians in occupied territory; targeting,
collateral damage and civilian casualties; enemy prisoner of war program; treatment of prison-
ers of war; repatriation of prisoners of war; uses of ruses and perfidy; war crimes; environmen-
tal terrorism; conduct of neutral nations; and the concept of "surrender" in the conduct of
combat operations.
Appendix L provides greater detail regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. Other
legal issues are discussed in the context of the overall narrative of that report.
5. U.S. DEP'T. OF DEFENSE, Joint Publication 1-02, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND As-
SOCIATED TERMS 206 (1989) [hereinafter Joint Publication 1-02]. The Department of Defense,
Army and Marine Corps use the traditional term law of war. The Navy and Air Force use law
of armed conflict.




Military lawyers (military judge advocates and civilian attor-
neys) long have played a role within the U.S. armed forces. Prior to
the Vietnam War, however, that role was limited to traditional areas
of government-oriented law,. such as military justice, contracting,
claims, administrative law (the interpretation and application of do-
mestic statutory law and/or departmental and service regulations),
and legal assistance. The international law field generally was lim-
ited to status of forces agreements, foreign claims, and the law of
war. Law of war work in turn was generally limited to training in
the law related to the handling of enemy prisoners of war and pro-
tection of other war victims protected by the four Geneva Conven-
tions of August 12, 1949.
Although an express legal obligation set forth in each of the
1949 Geneva Conventions requires law of war training regarding the
obligations imposed by those conventions,7 the last area tended to
suffer in its implementation. In May 1968 the Chief of Staff of the
Army wrote to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vi-
etnam (MACV), and noted his displeasure regarding recurring re-
ports of mistreatment of enemy prisoners of war by U.S. forces. In
response, the deputy commander, MACV, suggested that one reason
was that judge advocate-taught law of war instruction "has tended
to be abstract and academic, rather than concrete and practical."'
Failure to provide effective law of war training for U.S. military
forces was a key factor in the My Lai massacre. 9
The My Lai massacre was a watershed event in the Vietnam
War, U.S. military history, and the subsequent development of the
field of operational law, but it was not the only crucial event. The
Vietnam War was a complex conventional and counterinsurgency
war of small-unit operations fought under a microscope of critical
public attention. The war was subject to a number of political con-
straints that frustrated the pursuit of the international legal rights of
the United States. On an immediate basis, this led military com-
manders to turn to the assistance of their lawyers in responding to
some of the problems they faced. For example, people attired in ci-
7. For example, Article 127 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 states that:
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war,
to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their
respective countries, and in particular, to include the study thereof in their pro-
grams of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof
may become known to all their armed forces and to the entire population.
Id.
8. G. LEwY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 30-33, 230, 239, 367 (1978).
9. See LIEUTENANT GENERAL W. R. PEERS, THE MY LAI INQUIRY (1979). See also W.
H. Parks, Crimes in Hostilities, Marine Corps Gazette, Aug. 1976, at 16-22, and Sept. 1976,
at 33-39.
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vilian clothing might have been captured or detained by U.S. forces
because they had been engaged in a suspicious or even hostile activ-
ity at the time of their capture or detention; were these individuals to
be treated as guerrillas, innocent civilians, or "unprivileged belliger-
ents?""i Furthermore, if they were guerrillas, were they entitled to
prisoner of war status or protection? Article 5 of the Geneva Con-*
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War states that:
... .Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of
the enemy, . . . [are entitled to be a prisoner of war], such per-
sons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal.1
Judge advocates were called upon to prepare a regulation to es-
tablish the tribunals contemplated by Article 5. Working with other
members of the commander's personnel, judge advocates proceeded
to staff and conduct these tribunals. This was but one of several
ways in which the role of the military judge advocate expanded into
the warfighting business of his client in the course of the Vietnam
War.12 It reflected the growing complexity of warfighting, and the
degree to which a military commander's decisions were affected by
politico-legal considerations. Conducting tribunals to determine the
combatant status of captured enemy personnel was one of.many
ways in which military lawyers found their role expanding during
the Vietnam War.'"
Then in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the Department of
Defense promulgated new directives based upon lessons learned from
that conflict. Department of Defense Directive 5100.69 addressed
the problem of transfering enemy prisoners of war to another gov-
ernment that was unable or unwilling to live up to its Geneva Con-
vention obligations." As a result of the My Lai massacre and subse-
10. Baxter, So-called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs,
1952 BRIT. Y.B. Int'l L. XXVII 323-345.
11. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 5.
12. For fuller discussion, see Green, The Concept of 'War' and the Concept of 'Combat-
ants' in Modern Conflicts, in REVUE DE DROIT PENAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE
276 (1971).
13. An excellent account of the role of military lawyers from one of the four U.S. mili-
tary services is G. D. SOLIS, MARINES AND MILITARY LAW IN VIETNAM: TRIAL BY FIRE
(1989). Regrettably the Marine Corps is the only service to fully record the activities of its
lawyers in that conflict. The historical role of military lawyers in armed conflict(s) is reviewed
in Parks, The Law of War Adviser, REVUE DE DROIT PENAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA
GUERRE XVIII,4 359-417, and The JAG J. 31, 1 (1980).
14. Department of Defense Directive 5100.69 (December 27, 1972), Subject: DoD Pro-
gram for Prisoners of War and Other Detainees. Article 12 of the 1949 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War provides in part that "Prisoners of war may
only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a Party to the Convention and
after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee
[Vol. 10:3
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quent investigations of it, in 1974 the Department of Defense (DoD)
issued its first overall law of war directive. DoD Directive 5100.77
has set forth specific duties and responsibilities for law of war train-
ing for military personnel and the reporting of suspected violations of
the law of war committed by or against U.S. personnel.15
Critics of the Vietnam War frequently couched their criticism
as allegations that weapons employed by U.S. military forces, such
as the M- 16 rifle, cluster munitions, and napalm, were illegal. There-
fore, DoD Instruction 5500.15 established a requirement that any
new weapon or munition being considered for development or acqui-
sition by the United States must undergo a legal review to ensure its
consistency with the law of war obligations of the United States.' 6
Each of these directives required the implementation of directives
and programs by each of the military services.
Law of war instruction increased at all levels during the 1970s,
both within military units and the service staff and war colleges.
Lawyers serving as law of war instructors in that period found them-
selves confronted with hostile clients. Lawyers and the law of war
were blamed for restrictions placed upon the use of military force
during the Vietnam War. In order to respond to these accusations it
was necessary that lawyer-instructors, many of them veterans of Vi-
etnam service in the combat arms branches, ascertain the nature of
those restrictions and their basis. In each and every case, it was de-
termined that the restrictions in question were the result of policy
restrictions that were promulgated by either President Lyndon B.
Johnson or Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara,"7 or were
restrictions that the combat commander-client had imposed on him-
self because he thought a particular course of action might violate
the law of war, when in fact it did not.
To clarify this misunderstanding and to improve the working
relationship with the client, two steps were undertaken. In the first
step, in the late 1970s, the term "law affecting military operations"
was coined to indicate that there were a myriad of facets of the law
Power to apply the Convention." Id.
15. The current edition is Department of Defense Directive 5100.77 (July 10, 1979),
Subject: DoD Law of War Program.
16. Department of Defense Instruction 5500.15 (October 16, 1974), Subject: Review of
Legality of Weapons Under International Law. Despite claims to the contrary during the
course of the Vietnam War, each of the weapons in question were found to be in compliance
with the law of war at the 1978-1980 United Nations-sponsored Conference on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Ex-
cessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, held in Geneva. For an account of the
consideration of one of the weapons in question, see W.H. Parks, The Protocol on Incendiary
Weapons, INT'L REV. OF THE RED CRoss 279, 535'(1990).
17. For an analysis of those political restrictions from the standpoint of the law of war,
see ihe W. H. Parks, Rolling Thunder and the Law of War, AIR U. REV. XXXIII, 2 (1982),
[hereinafter Rolling Thunder], and Linebacker and the Law of War, AIR U. REV. XXXIV,
2 (1983).
Spring 1992]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
that affected both the deployment and employment of U.S. military
forces; emphasis was placed on the use of the law as a planning tool
that set forth the legal rights of the client (such as the right of self
defense) as well as his responsibilities. The phrase subsequently was
reduced to "operational law." This not only reflected the client's em-
phasis on the operational aspect of his business, but also temporarily
minimized use of the term "law of war" because of its pejorative
connotation in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam. As previously
indicated, however, the law of war remained and continues to remain
the foundation for the operational law program.
The second step taken was to get the client and his lawyer to
come together to discuss issues of mutual interest - even if the cli-
ent was unaware of their mutual interest. The idea was to make the
client aware of the many politico-legal facets of the lawyer's work, in
peace and war, while educating the lawyer on the work of the client.
Those two objectives were used to create this climate.
The first forum came on December 12, 1977, with the U.S. sig-
nature of the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949.18 Representatives of the U.S. military services
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were involved in the development of the
guidance for the U.S. delegation that attended the Diplomatic Con-
ference that drafted the two protocols. However, actual negotiation
was left in the hands of international lawyers, not all of whom were
entirely conversant with either the law of war or their client's busi-
ness. Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assent to the U.S. signa-
ture was contingent upon a full political-military review of those law
of war treaties before taking any decision as to U.S. ratification.
The U.S. review of the 1977 Protocols in all likelihood was the
most comprehensive review conducted by any nation. For military,
political and humanitarian reasons a decision was ultimately ren-
dered stating that the United States would not become a party to
Protocol I, but would accept Protocol 11.19 In the process of reaching
that decision, however, there was ample interaction between the law-
yer and client - the military commander(s) who ultimately would
live or die by the rules set forth in Protocols I and II. The work of
the military lawyer in this respect was no different from that of a
civilian attorney advising a civilian client, in the following manner:
telling the client the proposed new law, as well as the pros and cons
18. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, 621, 689 (3rd ed.
1988) (Protocol I and Protocol II).
19. Message of the President of the United States Transmitting the Protocol II Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts, concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977, 100th




behind it; asking whether it was acceptable and if it was not, why
not; and finally, inquiring about whether it could be fixed, or must it
be reviewed in its entirety? This interaction between lawyer and cli-
ent in review of Protocols I and II caused the client to come to ap-
preciate the important role of lawyers with respect to the law of war
and warfighting.2 0
The second forum was the Military Operations and Law Sym-
posium, the first of which took place at The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's School, U.S. Army, in 1982. The symposium assembles mili-
tary lawyers and principal operational planners from the various
Washington headquarters and every major U.S. command. Once as-
sembled, these people review military operations undertaken during
the preceding year, as well as anticipated operations, or review other
current areas of interest in the context of the legal issues that were
faced in the past, or it is anticipated will be faced in the future.
Discussion can be conducted at levels up to Top Secret. The Military
Operations and Law Symposium was an instant success, and has
been held annually since 1982.
Now that the client and lawyer were talking, the lawyer was
invited into discussions of operational matters. Lawyers at every
level found that commanders and their staffs labored under a num-
ber of misperceptions as to what they legally could or could not do.
Frequently legitimate military options were discarded because of
concerns that particular courses of action might be illegal. As law-
yers corrected these misperceptions, their stature grew with the cli-
ent. Lawyers began to find their role on the increase.
But some military lawyers found that their role stopped at the
door to the operations center - the very place where a commander
made the most critical decisions. This was not because the lawyer
necessarily was unwelcome, but because the lawyer lacked the neces-
sary security clearance for entry. This problem was addressed in
1979 by a directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that stated
that "Legal advisers should be immediately available to provide ad-
vice concerning law of war compliance during joint and combined
operations .... ."' In order to be "immediately available," the le-
gal adviser had to have the proper security clearance.
High-level security clearances are not easily procured; there is a
restriction on the number that may be issued, and each command is
allotted a set portion of that number. In order for a lawyer to obtain
20. A detailed discussion of the U.S. military review process is contained in the W. H.
Parks, Air War and the Law of War, AIR FORCE L. REv. 32,1, 89-218 (1990) [hereinafter Air
War].
21. The current Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum is MJCS 0124-88 (Aug. 4, 1988),
Subject: Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program.
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the security clearance to perform the job, it necessitated that the
commander take a clearance away from one of his non-lawyers. Ac-
complishing this within each command was the task of individual
staff judge advocates, and depended upon their selling the role to the
commander. Fortunately, the 1980s saw the emergence of the ac-
tivist lawyer within the military services. Individual commanders be-
came convinced that this was merely another way in which the law-
yer could provide the commander with a package of total legal
services.
Because one lawyer could not work twenty-four hours a day on
a continuous basis, the staff judge advocates' task was to convince
the commander not only that they required an upgraded security
clearance, but that they needed such clearances for several lawyers
on their staff. This was accomplished within each com-
mand-testimony to the rapport the activist military lawyer devel-
oped with his client during the 1980s. This was true in each of the
military services. The lawyer and his client each found that the more
the lawyer provided legal services for the client, the more the client
tended to turn to his lawyer for further legal services.
The work load at all levels of command expanded several times
over as a result, as did the demand for lawyers at lower levels of
command that might deploy independently. For example, lawyers
with the 82nd Airborne Division routinely deploy with individual bri-
gades, and did so during the 1983 Grenada rescue operation and the
1989 Operation Just Cause into Panama, meanwhile a Marine judge
advocate is a part of the staff with each Marine Expeditionary Unit
(i.e. a task-organized, reinforced Marine battalion, its supporting
arms and aviation components, and combat service support units)
that deploys as the Marine Corps portion of an Amphibious Ready
Group for peacetime training and contingency operations such as
noncombatant evacuations or disaster relief.22
Such judge advocate deployment would have been unthinkable
twenty years ago. Today most military commanders would consider
it equally unthinkable to deploy without a judge advocate as part of
the staff. The world of peacetime and wartime military operations
has become far more complex, and military lawyers have proved
their value to previously skeptical clients. In some cases this has ne-
22. A Navy-Marine Corps amphibious ready group routinely is deployed in the Mediter-
ranean and the Western Pacific. One example of its work is the nonpermissive noncombatant
evacuation from Mogadishu, Somalia, January 5-6, 1991, of 281 U.S. and foreign civilians
(representing thirty nations) just days before the commencement of Operation Desert Storm.
Its details are discussed in A. B. Siegel, An American Entebbe, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROC.
118,5, 96-100 (1992), AND CAPTAIN R. A. Doss, USMC, Rescue from Mogadishu, U.S. NA-
VAL INSTITUTE PROC. 5, 103-105, 118 (1992). The legal and political issues involved in a
noncombatant evacuation operation are discussed in W. H. Parks, Evacuation by Military
Force, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE 62, 9, Sept. 1978, at 24-33.
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cessitated that the lawyer establish special credentials to follow the
client, such as undergoing airborne or air assault training, but the
list of volunteer judge advocates willing to take on these high-profile,
high-risk assignments is much longer than the number of positions
available for them. To appreciate the role of the lawyer that
emerged in the years prior to Desert Storm, one particular aspect of
the military lawyer's work should be highlighted. Rules of engage-
ment are directives issued by competent military authority which de-
lineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States
military forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with
other forces encountered. 23 Rules of engagement generally were re-
garded to be within the purview of military commanders and their
staff.
In 1978, following an initiative of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertook to consolidate rules of en-
gagement for maritime forces into a single document. In the process,
military lawyers in the Pentagon were called upon to assist in their
drafting.24 The reason was two-fold: first, rules of engagement are
based upon the right of self defense expressed in Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations; and second, the drafting skills and
critical eye of lawyers were recognized by the staffs of the Office of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services. Moreover, lawyers in the
International Law Division of the Office of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral of the Navy had long played a role in offering legal advice to
the Navy staff on matters relating to the deployment of U.S. mari-
time forces; their role in preparation of this consolidated set of rules
of engagement was inevitable.
A 1979 Joint Chiefs of Staff consolidated a set of worldwide,
"peacetime '2 5 rules of engagement for maritime forces, and has
been followed by similar, updated and amended documents in 1983
and 1988, as well as has implemented directives by all subordinate
levels of command worldwide. Subsequent directives have been ex-
panded to cover air, land, and maritime operations. Lawyers at each
level of command were called upon to assist in taking a national doc-
ument and developing rules of engagement tailored to a particular
unit, its mission, its capabilities, and the environment in which the
unit may operate. This is no easy task. The rules of engagement for
an armored or infantry unit in a conventional war facing an Iraqi
23. Joint Publication 1-02, supra note 5, at 317. Lawyers have done the only writing on
the topic. See J. A. Roach, Rules of Engagement, Naval War C. Rev. XXXVI, 1, 46 (1983),
and the W. H. Parks, Righting the Rules of Engagement, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. 5, 83, 115
(1989) [hereinafter Righting].
24. See Righting, supra note 23, for a complete history of this evolution.
25. The current edition of which is The Joint Chiefs of Staff SM-846-88, Peacetime
Rules of Engagement (Oct. 28, 1988).
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military force in a desert environment devoid of civilians are sub-
stantially different from those for an infantry unit tasked with pro-
tecting the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq. Furthermore, a mili-
tary police or infantry unit called upon to maintain law and order in
Panama during Operation Just Cause or, for that matter, in the
streets of Los Angeles or some other U.S. city faces substantially
different problems. Expansion of U.S. military missions into areas
such as antiterrorism,"6 counterterrorism, 2 7 and counterdrug opera-
tions necessitated rules of engagement unique to each and every mis-
sion. Again, military lawyers have been called upon to assist in the
preparation of these rules of engagement, both at the national level
where overall guidance is provided, and at the "cutting edge" - the
unit(s) responsible for execution of the mission.
All this work placed additional demands upon the military law-
yer. As previously indicated, traditionally the scope of the military
lawyer's work has rested with military justice and a limited number
of other subjects. These additional military missions necessitated
that the lawyer become aware of the law that might affect these
additional missions. Courses had to be offered by the Army's Judge
Advocate General's School, the Naval Justice School, and the Air
Force Judge Advocate General's School to prepare judge advocates
for these new roles. Equally important, however, the judge advocate
assigned to a military unit with a special mission had to become inti-
mately familiar with the unit, its mission, and the unit's capabilities
for accomplishing that mission. In this respect military lawyers have
taken a lesson from their civilian counterparts. A civilian attorney
representing a bank must have a sound background not only in com-
mercial law, but also must possess some understanding of banking
practices.28 The difference between civilian and military practice is
that if a client in the former setting becomes dissatisfied with an
26. Antiterrorism is defined by Joint Publication 1-02, supra note 5, at 31, as "Defen-
sive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism." As the
primary responsibility for protection of US. nationals overseas lies with the host nation, and
any U.S. efforts must not infringe on the sovereign rights of the host nation, these matters
often require negotiation and or close work with host nation authorities.
27. Joint Publication 1-02, supra note 5, at 94, defines counterterrorism as "Offensive
measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism." This could include deployment of
U.S. military counterterrorist units for an overseas hostage rescue mission, such as the April
1980 attempt to rescue the U.S. hostages held by Iran in the United States Embassy, or like
direct action missions.
28. A classic example of this comes from the United Kingdom. In 1910 a young lawyer
by the name of Philip Lloyd-Greame took up practice in Lincoln's Inn with Sir Thomas Rat-
cliffe-Ellis who, in addition to his legal practice, was a leading figure in the British coal-mining
industry and principal organizer of the Mining Association of Great Britain. In order to gain
knowledge of the specialized field of mining law, Ratcliffe-Ellis worked in a coal mine for six
months. Lloyd-Greame, who changed his name to Cunliffe-Lister in 1924, emerged from the
coal mine to become a leading public servant prior to and following World War II. J. A.
CROSS, LORD SWINTON 14 (1982).
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attorney, that person may simply find another whom he feels will do
a better job. In the latter, the client simply stops talking to the law-
yer - a result that can lead to dire consequences in a "business"
that deals with people's lives and national security.
The result of the effort of the past two decades is that U.S.
military forces that were to be called upon to execute Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm had developed a solid working rela-
tionship between the military lawyer and his or her client. This was
the environment in which U.S. military forces would operate.
II. Operation Desert Shield
Operation Desert Shield began in response to Iraq's August 2,
1990, invasion of Kuwait. Within hours U.S. aircraft carrier battle
groups were in the area of operations; within days elements of the
82nd Airborne Division and the First Marine Expeditionary Force
were on the ground in Saudi Arabia, preparing to resist any effort by
Saddam Hussein to invade Saudi Arabia. They were supported by
U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps fighter aircraft flowing into the
theater.
In military parlance, this was a "come-as-you-are", "no-notice"
war. There is an important lesson here: military attorney relations
with commanders and their staffs, and law of war training for per-
sonnel, can not be put in abeyance until the outbreak of hostilities.
Each must be an on-going effort, in peace as well as in war, if they
are to be effective. The effort put forth by military attorneys in the
preceding decade had paid dividends by having an effective working
relationship in place when war broke out, and a military with far
better training in the law of war than at any time in U.S. history.
The mission of U.S. forces during Operation Desert Shield was
stated as follows: U.S. Central Command forces will deploy to the
area of operations and take actions in concert with host nation
forces, friendly regional forces, and other allies to defend against an
Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. Be prepared to conduct other opera-
tions as directed.
At this point in time, action was taking place on several levels.
On the international level, the Department of State was working
within the structure of the United Nations to condemn Iraq's inva-
sion of Kuwait and to call for withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Ku-
wait. United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (August 2,
1990), called the invasion a "breach of peace" and demanded imme-
diate, unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; eleven
additional Security Council resolutions were to follow over the next
four months. Simultaneously diplomatic initiatives were being under-
taken by the United States and other nations (such as the United
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Kingdom) to mobilize international opposition to the Iraqi invasion.
Each of these initiatives was couched in terms of Iraq's violation of
the Charter of the United Nations; Department of State lawyers
worked closely with their client(s) to frame each initiative in terms
that were legally correct. In most cases (time permitting), drafts of
various papers were shared with military and civilian lawyers in the
Pentagon as a part of the inter-agency coordination process.
On a separate international level, U.S. and coalition forces be-
gan to flow into the theater of operations. Because much of the ini-
tial manpower and supplies arrived by airlift, a question was raised
regarding overflight of other nations en route from the point of de-
parture, generally the continental United States, to the theater of
operations. Recognizing the international legal right of sovereignty
that each nation enjoys for its landmass, its territorial sea, and the
airspace above them, it was necessary to ascertain which nations
would permit U.S. overflight for Desert Storm operations; this was
an example of the use of the law as a planning tool, since overflight
and refueling rights would affect plans for the deployment of the
forces to the theater of operations.
Normally members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) restrict landing, refueling, and overflight privileges within
their respective nations to NATO missions. Diplomatic initiatives
opened those bases, as well as overflight rights over traditionally neu-
tral Switzerland and Austria, to U.S. military and chartered civilian
aircraft en route to Southwest Asia. Meanwhile, other nations
proved less cooperative. India refused to permit Marine Corps com-
bat aircraft overflight rights from their Western Pacific bases, neces-
sitating a flight route of twice the distance back across the Pacific,
the continental United States, the Atlantic, and Europe. Egypt re-
fused basing authority for U.S. aircraft until the United States for-
gave Egypt's $6.7 billion dollar foreign military sales debt. State De-
partment and military lawyers worked closely with one another and
their respective clients in identifying, addressing, and attempting to
resolve basing and overflight problems.
U.S. forces assigned to Desert Shield were under the command
of U.S. Central Command, known within military circles as
"CENTCOM." Before CENTCOM deployed from its home at
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, its staff judge advocate was in
communication with his legal counterparts above and subordinate to
his headquarters, as well as the various elements of the CENTCOM
staff. This allowed the Staff Judge Advocate to anticipate the legal
issues he would face in supporting the command and its mission.
At this point in time it is appropriate to provide some idea of
the levels at which legal advice was being provided. Starting at the
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very top, a civilian attorney works at the National Security Council.
This attorney coordinates national policy issues with senior policy-
making clients within the White House and the National Security
Council and the legal counterparts at the Department of Defense,
State, Justice, Treasury, and the other agencies of the U. S. Govern-
ment. At the Department of State, the Office of the Legal Adviser
addresses legal issues concerning execution of U.S. foreign policy.
For military operations, the Secretary of Defense has his sepa-
rate General Counsel, as do each of the service secretaries. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the Legal Counsel. The
chiefs of the military services and the service departments are served
by a Judge Advocate General, while the Marine Corps has its sepa-
rate legal office for responding to questions of the Commandant of
the Marine Corps that would not normally be addressed by the
Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
Below these levels are military judge advocates working with
the theater commanders. Judge advocates at the U.S. Atlantic and
Pacific commands had to address legal issues (such as the overflight
of India question) that would affect movement of forces through its
theater of operations or movement of forces and/or material from its
command to CENTCOM's area of operations. It should be noted
that at every level, coordination of legal positions or issues had to be
up and down the chain of command, as well as across command
lines. The idea was to support CENTCOM in its execution of its
mission, anticipating the legal issues that might arise, rather than
wondering whether a particular option was "legal" or "illegal."
Again a parallel can be drawn to civilian practice. A lawyer deter-
mines a client's needs and proceeds to assist in meeting those needs
through the processes set forth in law and/or regulation. So, too, did
the operational lawyer support his or her client in the Desert Shield
build-up of U.S. and Coalition forces in Southwest Asia.
Below these command and policy levels were the commands re-
sponsible for carrying out the plans devised by CENTCOM - the
"shooters," aviation elements, communications experts, and logistic
specialists. Some had the responsibility for fine tuning the law of war
knowledge of the individual soldier; all had to concern themselves
with peacetime and wartime rules of engagement for their respective
commands, whether an infantry unit or a logistic support base that
would be concerned with rear area security in an area populated by
civilians. Others had to address fundamental issues regarding sup-
port for the deployed soldier and accomplishment of that unit's mis-
sion. Lawyers in all commands deploying to Southwest Asia played a
major role in preparing the members of their commands for entry
into a substantially different culture. They conducted a preventive
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law program in which the judge advocates worked closely with other
elements of the unit staff. Lawyers at every level continued to pro-
vide traditional legal services, such as preparing wills and powers of
attorney, for personnel within their command. Similar services were
provided for dependents of military personnel by lawyers who re-
mained at home posts, or by Army Reserve judge advocates who
lived in the local community.
Legal issues could come up or down the chain of command. To
gain a perspective for this, the author usually arrived in his Pentagon
office around 5:00 A.M., where he would call his counterpart at
CENTCOM headquarters (where it was 1:00 P.M.) by secure tele-
phone to determine the issue(s) that required particular attention. At
7:00 A.M. the author or another member of the office would attend
the morning briefing for the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of
Staff of the Army in the Army Operations Center (along with The
Judge Advocate General of the Army and the General Counsel of
the Army, or their designated representatives) where other legal is-
sues might be raised. The balance of the day would be spent coordi-
nating with counterparts in the other services, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Office of the General Counsel of the Department of De-
fense, or the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, on
the issues that had arisen in the course of that day. Much of this
coordination was accomplished by telephone, but some required face-
to-face meetings. The workday generally ran sixteen to eighteen
hours, seven days a week, from August 1990 through March 1991.
This was true not only for the author's office, but for lawyers work-
ing at every level of command.
During the 1983 U.S. rescue operation in Grenada, a desk for a
legal representative was established in the Army Operations Center,
a practice that has continued to this day. The desk had to be
manned twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, so that ques-
tions could be addressed on the short-notice basis in which they usu-
ally arose. As the International and Operational Law Division of the
Office of The Judge Advocate General is small, it became apparent
that that office could not work the long days that had begun and
man the desk in the Army Operations Center. Other lawyers in the
Office of The Judge Advocate General were (in military parlance)
"volunteered" to work shifts at the desk. As all military judge advo-
cates receive law of war training, many of the questions could be
addressed by the person on watch. If the question were more com-
plex or esoteric, a response could be placed in abeyance until a mem-
ber of the International and Operational Law Division arrived in" the
office, or a member of that office would be contacted and asked to
come in to answer the question. (As a general rule, the "tough"
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questions invariably were received in Washington around 2:00 A.M.)
In addition to the military judge advocates "volunteered" for watch
duty, Army Reserve judge advocates with international law experi-
ence volunteered (in the true sense of the word) to stand watches or
work in the International and Operational Law Division, as did a
Nevada National Guard judge advocate.
As the CENTCOM headquarters was moved to Saudi Arabia, a
number of legal issues emerged. Two key areas were foreign criminal
jurisdiction and host nation support. The former involved efforts to
negotiate a status of forces agreement with nations in which U.S.
military forces were to be stationed (not all were stationed within
Saudi Arabia). The latter involved a series of questions regarding
services to be provided by the host nation, such as what services a
host nation was likely to provide; 'who and how it would be pro-
vided'; and who would pay. for it, the "guest" or the host. This in-
volved the most fundamental of services, such as provision for water
for personnel and aviation fuel for the hundreds of aircraft arriving
daily. There had to be accountability procedures for services pro-
vided, payment procedures, and an assignment of contracts. U.S. do-
mestic law came into play in some cases. There are statutory limits
on minor military construction,29 and similar limits on acquisition
under the NATO Mutual Support Act. 30 These and a number of
other issues had to be addressed as U.S. and Coalition forces moved
into the theater of operations.
Legal issues concerning civilian personnel also arose. In Opera-
tions Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the United States employed
civilians in the theater of operations both as career civil service em-
ployees and indirectly as contractor employees. Civilians worked as
part of the military transportation system, at the forward depot level
repair and intermediate level maintenance facilities, and as weapons
systems technical representatives. Civilians worked alongside their
military counterparts aboard U.S. Navy ships, on U.S. Air Force
bases, and in virtually every U.S. Army unit. In addition to U.S.
civilians fulfilling a number of critical functions, a number of local
nationals.and third-country civilians were employed by U.S. and for-
eign contractors.
In addition, a number of civilian personnel programs had to be
re-evaluated in light of the experience of Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. One of the most significant concerns the status of "civilians"
in the law of war. Prior to Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the mili-
tary services had recognized that the increasing number of civilians
29. 10 U.S.C. §2805 (1982).
30. 10 U.S.C. §2347 (1982). Other issues related to responsibility sharing and host na-
tion support are discussed in Appendix P, Conduct of the Gulf War, supra note 3.
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employed in combat service support roles meant that the traditional
law of war distinction between "combatants" and "civilians" was no
longer realistic. The U.S. military review of the 1977 Additional
Protocol I acknowledged that the technological advance of military
forces during the Twentieth Century had increased the role of civil-
ians in military planning and operations. This raised serious ques-
tions concerning the practicality of the distinction between "combat-
ants" and "civilians" as it had been put forward in Article 51(3) of
Additional Protocol 1.31
In the military services of many nations, civilian positions had
been substituted for uniformed military personnel, usually for eco-
nomic reasons. The issue was: If a civilian assumes a work responsi-
bility previously assigned to a uniformed member of the armed ser-
vices, was the work done by that person now immune from attack?
It was the position of lawyers within the military services that a ci-
vilian occupying such a position realistically was a "combatant," and
therefore subject to attack or capture.
This raised collateral issues, both in the domestic international
spheres. Could a civilian employee be ordered to go enter an area
where he or she might be at personal risk? What actions should be
taken if a civilian employee decided that he or she no longer wanted
to be in the theater of operations? Could that person "quit" in the
middle of a war and, if so, what priority did he or she have for trans-
portation out of the theater? If these persons were at risk, what re-
sponsibility did the military have for arming them and training them
in the safe operation of- a personal defense weapon? If civilian em-
ployees were captured, would they be entitled to prisoner of war sta-
tus? What steps could/should the military services take to enhance
the likelihood that a captured civilian employee would be treated as
a prisoner of war?
These were but a few of the legal questions raised with regard
to the approximately 5,000 civilians working in the theater of opera-
tions during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.32 In the aftermath of
those operations, a new Department of Defense Directive was devel-
3 1. Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I provides that "Civilians shall enjoy the protec-
tion. . .[from intentional attack] unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostili-
ties." Id.
The U.S. military study determined that there was no agreed definition as to what the
term "direct" meant, such as whether it extended only to combatant-type activities carried out
by any soldier, or whether it involved hostile acts. Moreover, to allow a civilian to engage in
hostile activities (during which time he or she would be subject to attack), then regain immu-
nity by temporarily ceasing such actions (perhaps to stop for a meal, or to rest) would not only
make a mockery of the intended purpose of the law of war but might place civilians who truly
are not taking part in hostilities at greater risk. For further analysis of this point, see Air War,
supra note 20, at 116-134.
32. The issue of civilian accompanying U.S. forces in Desert Shield/Desert Storm is
discussed in Appendix N to the DoD report Conduct of the Gulf War, supra note 3.
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oped to codify the lessons learned from the war."3 Civilian personnel
lawyers in the Office of The Judge Advocate General of the Army,
the other services, and the Department of Defense played a major
role in development of a policy that recognized the modern nature of
the battlefield while placing a traditional law of war concept, distinc-
tion between "combatant" and "civilian," into its proper modern
context.
Other issues involved long-range planning. For instance, in Au-
gust 1990 CENTCOM contdmplated that if hostilities were to com-
mence, Iraqi soldiers would be taken as prisoners of war. In particu-
lar, because of cultural sensitivities, it seemed sensible to arrange for
their transfer to the host nation, which was Saudi Arabia. This ne-
cessitated a written agreement, which required work by the author's
office, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of
State, the United States Ambassador in Riyadh, and the staff judge
advocate for CENTCOM. Ultimately an agreement was reached,
but only after extensive drafting, coordination, and negotiation.
The CENTCOM mission statement quoted above clearly placed
U.S. forces in a self-defense posture, yet left them with the warning
that they should be prepared to go into action on short notice, either
in self defense against an Iraqi attack or on offensive operations to
liberate Kuwait. This necessitated the CENTCOM staff judge advo-
cate coordinating with subordinate commands to ensure their under-
standing of their rules of engagement. It was necessary to prepare
two sets of rules of engagement, one "peacetime" self defense set
and the other a set for hostilities. Ground forces at every level had to
be thoroughly (and almost daily, due to the changing environment)
briefed on these rules, as were aviators and commanders of ships in
the various naval task forces.
Operating in accordance with the authority provided by United
Nations Security Council Resolution 665 (August 25, 1990), a pro-
gram for maritime interception was established early in Desert
Shield .3 Navy and Marine Corps judge advocates with expertise in
the law of the sea and the law of naval warfare regularly provided
legal advice while preparing, amending, and adjusting the rules of
engagement in an environment that constantly changed. Preparation
of these rules of engagement necessitated close coordination with
other participating naval forces to avoid different interpretations of
the rules in force. Judge advocates were responsible for an assign-
ment that was extremely dynamic.
33. Department of Defense Directive 1404.10 (April 10, 1992), Subject: Emergency-
Essential DoD U.S. Citizen Civilian Employees.
34. The maritime interception program is discussed in Chapter IV of Conduct of the
Gulf War, supra note 3.
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Other issues were raised on a short-notice basis that required
immediate attention. For example, Article 38 of the 1949 Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field requires all medical person-
nel, medical transports, and medical units to display the Red Cross
or the Red Crescent to facilitate their identification. 5 Given that
Saudi Arabia uses the Red Crescent, would the U.S. and its West-
ern, Christian Coalition members have to display the Red Crescent
rather than the Red Cross? According to the language of Article 38,
only nations already using the Red Crescent at the time of the draft-
ing of the treaty are authorized to use the Red Crescent in lieu of
the Red Cross, although nations that had gained their independence
since 1949 and had become party to this treaty have exercised an
option as to which distinctive emblem each will use. There is no pro-
vision for the United States to use the Red Crescent, and it was not
the intention of the U.S. to change from the Red Cross. However, at
the request of Saudi Arabia and as an accommodation to the host
nation, the U.S. and other Western Christian members of the Coali-
tion displayed a smaller Red Crescent alongside the Red Cross.
Similarly, would the U.S. hospital ships have to display the Red
Crescent? Hospital ships are covered by the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea.36 Article 43 of that
convention provides for the display of the-Red Cross only; there is no
provision for use or display of the Red Crescent. Had the U.S. re-
ceived a request from Saudi Arabia or any other nation for either of
the two U.S. hospital ships to display the Red Crescent while in that
nation's territorial waters, the request would have been considered
not from a legal but a policy standpoint. Although not expressly au-
thorized, neither is the display of the Red Crescent prohibited by the
treaty in question.)
Early in Desert Shield Iraqi soldiers began defecting or desert-
ing to Coalition forces along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. Since the
United States and its allies were not yet "parties to the conflict" as
that term is stated in Article 2 common to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions, a question of applicability of the treaties was raised;
that is, were the deserting or defecting Iraqi soldiers entitled to pris-
oner of war status, and the protections provided by the 1949 Geneva
35. Geneva Convention for the Ameliorative of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949, art. 38, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Convention on Wounded and Sick].
. 36. Geneva Convention for the Ameliorative of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949, art. 43, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter convention on wounded and sick].
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Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War?3 7 Since
the United States and its Coalition partners wished to encourage de-
fection or desertion of Iraqi soldiers, all deserting or defecting Iraqi
soldiers would be provided prisoner of war protection, even if not
legally entitled to the status as such. They received all the benefits of
the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War as if that treaty applied in fact. 8
Anticipating that U.S. personnel might be captured if hostilities
broke out between Iraq and the Coalition, an ad hoc Department of
Defense Prisoner of War Advisory Committee was established within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Representatives on this com-
mittee included legal advisers from the Office of the General Coun-
sel, Department of Defense; Office of the Legal Adviser, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the author's office. The com-
mittee considered questions concerning U.S., Coalition, and enemy
prisoners of war, since legally, and the Secretary of the Army is the
Executive Agent for enemy prisoners of war. 9
In establishing the law of war program, DoD Directive 5100.77
appointed the Secretary of the Army the Executive Agent for the
investigation of alleged violations of the law of war committed
against U.S. personnel.40 In light of reports that Iraqi forces in Ku-
wait and Iraq had taken U.S. citizens hostage in the opening hours
of the Kuwaiti invasion, the author's office began a file of suspected
or alleged violations of the law of war by the Government of Iraq. A
meeting of lawyers and policy makers from the military services, Of-
fice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Departments of Defense, State,
and Justice was held in late August 1990 to consider what further
steps needed to be taken. It was decided that the Army would con-
tinue its investigation. The Secretary of the Army mobilized two re-
serve judge advocate international law teams to assist CENTCOM
headquarters and the author's office in its work. Those teams were
joined by two Naval Reserve judge advocates who volunteered for
active duty. One team was sent to Southwest Asia, while the second
remained to work in the Pentagon."'
37. Supra note 7.
38. Article 2 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions states in part that "...the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them." Id. A state of war existed between Kuwait and Iraq prior to
January 16, 1992, but not between the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and their Coalition partners and
Iraq. Nonetheless, the United States always has taken a liberal interpretation in providing
prisoner of war protection, even where formal applicability of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
was in doubt. See U.S. Department of the Army, DAJA-IA 183/7031 (November 4, 1983),
Subject: Geneva Conventions Status of Enemy Personnel Captured During URGENT FURY.
39. DoD Directive 5100.69, supra note 14, at para. VB.
40. DoD Directive 5100.77, supra note 15, at para. E2f.
41. Two U.S. Naval Reserve judge advocates also volunteered for and served on active
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On December 10-11, 1990 International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) representatives met with Department of Defense offi-
cials to discuss war conduct should hostilities occur. The ICRC offi-
cials presented the U.S. officials with a memorandum the ICRC
maintained constituted the law of war obligations of all potential
parties to the conflict. They advised that a copy of the memorandum
was being provided to all potential combatant nations, including
Iraq. The ICRC officials asked that the paper be transmitted to all
military commanders as a statement of national policy.4"
This raised questions with regard to the precise role of the
ICRC, and as to the correctness of its statement. The latter in turn
raised questions regarding the portions of the law of war that would
be applicable were hostilities to commence.
The ICRC has long occupied a position of leadership with re-
gard to respect for the Geneva Conventions. However, those treaties
address the protection of "war victims" which included: medical per-
sonnel, uhits, and equipment, and combatants hors de combat or
who have fallen into enemy hands. With the development of the
1977 Additional Protocols and their rules on warfighting, the ICRC
has endeavored to assume a role with regard to the actual conduct of
hostilities. This is a role for which it neither has been appointed, nor
one in which it is regarded as having any expertise. Even its role in
implementation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is subject to the
consent of the nations involved.'
3
The answer to the first question was that rules for warfighting
offered by the ICRC were advisory only, and that only if they were
correct statements of the law of war. This necessitated a comparison
of law of war treaties and nations party to them to the list of poten-
tial participants should hostilities arise. Such a list in fact had been
begun on August 3, 1990, and maintained throughout Desert Storm
as additional nations joined the Coalition to liberate Kuwait.
In addition to the United Nations Charter, with its prohibition
against the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of an sovereign state, treaties applicable to
the Gulf War were: Hague Convention IV and its Annex Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land of October 18, 1907;"'
Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
duty in support of the Army's war crimes investigation. The work of the war crimes teams is
discussed at pages 0-22 to 0-25 of DoD's Conduct of the Gulf War, supra note 3.
. 42. International Committee of the Red Cross, Memorandum on the Applicability of
International Humanitarian Law in the Gulf Region.
43. For example, Article 9 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War, supra note 7, states that the activities of the ICRC and similar organizations
shall be carried out "subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned .... " Id.
44. Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land of October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539, 1 Bevans 631.
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Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land of October 18, 1907;"'
Hague Convention VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Sub-
marine Contact Mines of October 18, 1907;"" Hague Convention IX
Concerning Bombardment of Naval Forces in Time of War of Octo-
ber 18, 1907;"" Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare of June 17, 1925;"' and Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9,
1948."' In addition The four Geneva Conventions for the Protection
of War Victims of August 12, 1949, were the following:
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded and. Sick in Armed Forces in the Field;50 Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea;51 .Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of.Prisoners of War;52 and Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 53 Finally,
there was the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Prop-
erty in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 14, 1954.
54
Since Iraq, Kuwait, France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other
Coalition members are parties to this treaty, the treaty was binding
between Iraq and Kuwait, as well as among Iraq and those Coalition
members in the conflict. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
United States are not parties to this treaty. However, the treaty has
been fully implemented by U.S. military forces for more than three
decades, and Canadian, British, and U.S. military personnel receive
training on its provisions. Recognizing that if hostilities were to oc-
cur they would take place in the "cradle of civilization," the treaty
was followed by all Coalition forces throughout the Gulf War.
Three other law of war treaties were not legally applicable in
the Gulf War, but nonetheless bear mention.
First, there was the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Mili-
tary or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Tech-
niques (ENMOD Convention). 5 While the United States and many
45. Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land of October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. 540, 1 Bevans 654.
46. Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land of October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332, T.S. 541, 1 Bevans 669.
47. Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land of October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351, T.S. 542, 1 Bevans 681.
48. Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land of October 18, 1907, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. 8061, 94 LNTS 65.
49. 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
50. Convention on Wounded and Sick, supra note 34.
51. Convention on Wounded and Sick, Supra note 35.
52. Supra note 7.
53. 6 U.S.T. 3516, TIAS 3365, 75 UNTS 287.
54. Schindler & Toman, supra note 17, at 745-768.
55. ENMOD Convention, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. 9614.
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of its Coalition partners were parties to this treaty at the time of the
Gulf War, Iraq had signed but not ratified it. Thus, Iraq by its sig-
nature was bound not to take actions inconsistent with the conven-
tion, 56 while the ENMOD Convention was not regarded as legally
applicable to Iraqi actions during the conflict. The U.S. and its Coa-
lition partners nevertheless remained bound by the treaty.
Second, there was the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949 (Protocol 1). 57 Iraq and several ma-
jor Coalition members, including the United States, Great Britain,
and France, are not parties to Protocol I; therefore, it was not appli-
cable during the Gulf War.
Third, there was the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Re-
strictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons.58 Iraq and
most of the Coalition members, including the United States, are not
parties to this treaty; it had no applicability in the Gulf War. How-
ever, U.S. and Coalition actions were consistent with its language.
Iraqi actions were consistent with the treaty except as to its provi-
sions on land mines and booby traps.
In reviewing the ICRC memorandum, it was determined that
the ICRC had erred in relying heavily on the language of the 1977
Protocol I in the development of its memorandum. The memoran-
dum was reviewed and re-transmitted to all commands with careful
annotation as to its correctness, with regard to the law of war obliga-
tions of the United States." Subsequently, it was determined that
the United States was the only nation that had transmitted the
ICRC document to its military forces.
The five months preceding commencement of Desert Storm had
seen the largest deployment of U.S. forces in that space of time in
military history. Its accomplishment is all the more impressive in
that it began from a standing start. In that period, lawyers at all
levels of command had answered literally thousands of questions in
the operational law field. The foregoing merely provides a sampling
of some of those questions. What is important to appreciate is that
U.S. detailed attention to and compliance with the law of war in
execution of Operation Desert Storm occurred because of the foun-
dation laid by military lawyers during the preceding two decades.
III. Operation Desert Storm
Operation Desert Storm commenced on January 17, 1991, with
56. Article 18, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).
57. Schindler & Toman, supra note 18, pp. 621-688.
58. Schindler & Toman, supra note 18, pp. 179-196.
59. U.S. Department of the Army message 111800Z (Jan. 11, 1991), Subject: ICRC
Law of War Memorandum.
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the air campaign nicknamed Instant Thunder.8 It was to continue at
a high pace for thirty-eight days, until the ground offensive crossed
into Iraq and Kuwait on February 24th. Many of the law of war
issues and much of the operational law work that began during De-
sert Shield required further attention. For example, the surrender of
Iraqi soldiers increased as the air bombardment of their positions
intensified, and U.S. and Coalition forces began to implement their
plans for care for Iraqi prisoners of war in a manner consistent with
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War. The United States entered into agreements with Great Britain
and France that the U.S. would care for all Iraqi prisoners of war
captured by those nations. The International Committee of the Red
Cross requested permission to visit with Iraqi prisoners of war in
Coalition hands, which was granted.61
The mission of Desert Storm was as follows: [U.S. Central
Command] will conduct offensive operations, in concert with Coali-
tion forces to accomplish the following: Neutralize Iraqi national
command authority; eject Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait; destroy
the Republican Guard; as early as possible, destroy Iraq's ballistic
missile nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare capabilities; and as-
sist in the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.
Instant Thunder was planned to accomplish many of these
objectives, to support ground forces in their ejection of Iraqi ground
forces from Kuwait, and to contribute to the destruction of the Re-
publican Guard. Its meticulous planning and execution resulted in
substantial accomplishment of these objectives. The issues that sub-
sequently arose, revealed a side of the law of war that has been seen
in past conflicts, and particularly in the Vietnam War: use of the law
of war by an enemy in its disinformation campaign.
Saddam Hussein had made a careful study of the Vietnam
War, including limitations on U.S. airpower through shielding legiti-
mate military objectives through use of the civilian population and
civilian objects, and through a disinformation campaign alleging
substantial civilian casualties."2 In addition to facing the most highly
60. The air campaign is discussed in detail in Chapter VI of the DoD Report Conduct of
the Gulf War, supra note 3. The name Instant Thunder was selected in express rejection of
the graduated application of force approach taken by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNa-
mara in the 1965-1968 Rolling Thunder air campaign against North Vietnam. See Rolling
Thunder, supra note 17, and K. P. Werrell, Air War Victorious: The Gulf War vs. Vietnam,
PARAMETERS XXII, 2 41-54 (1992).
61. On the other hand, the DoD report Conduct of the War is critical of the ICRC in
that, while it had unlimited access to Iraqi prisoners of war in Coalition hands, ICRC actions
on behalf of U.S. and other Coalition prisoners of war in Iraqi hands were virtually nonexis-
tent. See p. 0-19, Conduct of the War, supra note 3.
62. See N. Cigar, Iraq's Strategic Mindset and the Gulf War: Blueprint for Defeat,
THE J. OF STRATEGIC STUD. 1, 2, 4, 13-14 (1992), and C. de Caro, War of the Airwaves, The
PROV. J. B-4 (1992).
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integrated and densest air defense environment in airpower history,
the Coalition air campaign had to be waged with this in mind. Rules
of engagement for air forces were prepared to take all reasonable
measures to minimize collateral civilian casualties and injury to in-
nocent civilians incidental to the attack of lawful targets. Unlike the
air campaigns against North Vietnam, however, lawyers correctly
advised their clients at the various levels that U.S. and Coalition air
forces need not assume all responsibility for minimization of collat-
eral damage and injury, nor sustain unacceptable losses of friendly
forces to further minimize collateral injury or damage. If Saddam
Hussein persisted in placing military equipment in densely populated
areas, or refused to take normal air defense precautions, such as
evacuation of civilians from the vicinity of immovable military objec-
tives, he assumed responsibility for collateral civilian casualties and
collateral damage to civilian objects should it occur despite the best
efforts of U.S. and Coalition aircrews. This is a classic example of
the lawyer advising his client as to his rights. While collateral civil-
ian losses always are regrettable, the law of war is not a suicide pact
requiring that a military commander accept unacceptable losses of
his forces where his opponent refuses to discharge his law of war
obligations.
While lawyers continued in their advisory role with regard to
review of the daily target lists, the focus shifted slightly from the
commander to his public affairs officer. Public affairs officers at the
Department of State, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and U.S. CENTCOM daily provided live briefings on military oper-
ations to a watching world. The words used in their statements were
of critical importance, as were the U.S. responses to Iraqi dis-
information regarding attacks on targets in populated areas, the at-
tack on the biological weapons facility characterized by Saddam
Hussein as a "Baby Milk Factory," and the destruction of the Al
Firdus command and control bunker (intentionally mischaracterized
by Saddam Hussein as an "air raid shelter")6 3 in which civilian rela-
tives of the officers employed therein had taken shelter. The wording
of public statements was as critical as the most important contract
or set of jury instructions a lawyer could draft. The difference lay in
the time sensitivity of the preparation, often measured in minutes.
In the midst of the air campaign, two Iraqi MiG-21 Fishbed
fighter aircraft were found immediately outside the entrance to the
ancient temple of Ur. Legitimate military targets may be attacked
63. A disinformation effort exacerbated by use of the same term by CNN's Peter Arnett
in his newscasts, for which he was criticized within his own network. See P. M. SMITH, How
CNN FOUGHT THE WAR 33-38 (1991). The Al Firdus command and control bunker issue is
discussed on pages 0-14 and 0-15, Conduct of the Gulf War, supra note 3.
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wherever they may be located, even if located outside the most im-
portant cultural property.6" The'CENTCOM staff was aware that
the aircraft had been placed there by Saddam Hussein to shield
them from destruction or, if attacked, to cause serious damage to Ur
that would erode international and U.S. domestic support for Desert
Storm, and possibly fragment the Coalition. The gain from destruc-
tion of the MiG-21s would have been outweighed by the negative
effect of damage to Ur. Recognizing that the MiG-21s had been ren-
dered ineffective by their placement at Ur, the decision was made
that they would not be attacked. This was the practical side of im-
plementation of the law of war in the course of the air campaign: as
target lists were developed around the clock in a very fluid situation,
lawyers had to be available twenty-four hours a day to respond to
time-sensitive issues. Once again, the system established in the 1980s
of placing a lawyer in the operations center at each level of com-
mand paid dividends.
The air campaign resulted in the first Coalition personnel being
captured by Iraq. Television viewers in the United States and around
the world began to see U.S. and other Coalition aircrew members
appearing before television cameras, where they would "confess" to
war crimes against Iraq. Their coercion was apparent. Senior U.S.
officials turned to their lawyers for advice as to the rights of U.S.
and other Coalition prisoners of war in Iraqi hands.
Simultaneously, an increasing number of Iraqi soldiers were de-
serting or defecting to U.S. forces. The International Committee of
the Red Cross protested a photograph published by U.S. media ser-
vices showing Iraqi prisoners of war in U.S. custody, claiming that
any photograph of a prisoner of war was prohibited by the 1949 Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(GPW). Senior U.S. officials again turned to their lawyers not only
to determine the legal obligations of the United States, but to recon-
cile any U.S. protest of Iraqi treatment and display of U.S. and
other Coalition prisoners of war with photographs of Iraqi prisoners
of war iri U.S. custody.
The language of the GPW is not as clear as claimed by the
64. Article 27 of the Annex to Hague Convention IV of 1907, supra note 44, states in
part that In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as
possible, "buildings dedicated to religion . . . historic monuments . . . provided they are not
being used at the time for military purposes." Id.
Article 4(1) of the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, supra note 54, states in
part that "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated within
their own territory . . . by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate sur-
roundings . . . for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event
of armed conflict. ... Id.
Article 4(2) states that "The obligations mentioned in paragraph I . . . may be waived
only in cases where military necessity requires such a waiver." Id.
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ICRC in its complaint. Article 13 provides in part that prisoners of
war must be shielded from both insults and public curiosity. There is
no prohibition on photographing prisoners of war, and it was pointed
out that the ICRC itself makes extensive use of photographs of pris-
oners of war in its various publications, press materials, and the
ICRC museum at its headquarters in Geneva.
Photographs of prisoners of war, of course, may be used in a
way that subjects prisoners of war to the public curiosity prohibited
by Article 13. This is particularly true when those photographs are
used for propaganda purposes and have been gained by use of tor-
ture or intimidation, which are prohibited by Articles 13 and 17, of
the GPW. This was the basis for the protest ultimately made by the
United States to Iraqi filming of U.S. and other Coalition prisoners
of war. In turn, U.S. officials were aware that the capture of enemy
personnel is a news event, as is their care in conformity with the
GPW. A clear balancing between media interest and protection of
the dignity of Iraqi prisoners of war had to be accomplished. U.S.
officials also were concerned that families of Iraqi prisoners of war
might be at risk if the prisoners of war were identified by Iraqi au-
thorities from photographs taken by the media. Accordingly, guid-
ance was issued by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs that balanced these competing requirements. Lawyers on the
staffs of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, at
CENTCOM, and in the Office of The Judge Advocate General of
the Army coordinated closely with one another and with their re-
spective clients to develop and implement this policy.'
5
While the air campaign was underway, some humanitarian as-
sistance organizations sought to provide humanitarian aid to Iraqi
civilians. As relief columns would travel from Jordan to Baghdad, it
was necessary for these relief organizations to coordinate their move-
ment with the Coalition, particularly given the intense Coalition
hunt underway in western Iraq for Iraqi Scud missiles and their
launchers. Lawyers on the CENTCOM staff were involved in the
ensuing discussions with these relief organizations, and in reconcilia-
tion of issues that arose with regard to their movement within areas
of combat operations.
The Iraqi disinformation campaign led to another role for law-
yers within the government. Members of the media sought informa-
tion on the law of war, and lawyers within the Pentagon daily found
themselves responding to media inquiries through the various public
affairs offices, or talking directly to the press about a range of law of
war issues. Similar inquiries came from some human rights groups.
65. Memorandum of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (February 2,
1991), Subject: Photography of Enemy Prisoners of War.
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For example, Human Rights Watch, a human rights organization,
expressed an interest in law of war issues arising from the conflict
but admitted its ignorance of that area of the law. A senior official of
Middle East Watch met with lawyers in the Pentagon in order to
gain an understanding of the law of war issues. The lawyer's role not
only included service to the client but to the general public as well.66
Operation Desert Storm's final phase began early on February
24, 1991, with U.S. and Coalition ground forces breaching the Iraqi
defensive lines and racing forward into Kuwait and Iraq. The ground
offensive ended after one hundred hours of action. This led to other
legal issues. The rules of engagement for combat had to be revised to
reflect the ceasefire and its terms; the specific terms of ceasefire
which the Coalition expected Iraqi forces would have to observe, to
include collateral issues such as prompt repatriation of Coalition
prisoners of war, had to be drafted.
The fighting that broke out between the Shi'ite minority and
Iraqi military forces-in and around the city of Basrah following the
cessation of Coalition offensive operations caused a number of Iraqi
civilians to flee that area. Many entered the previously-uninhabited
desert areas of Iraq held by Coalition forces. This raised a new issue:
Was the United States and its Coalition partners an "occupying
power" in the terms of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War? If so, what were its
obligations to care for these refugees, particularly in light of the fact
that the forces had to be prepared to re-engage Iraqi forces if the
ceasefire failed, or to withdraw from Iraq on short notice. What as-
sistance could be sought from international relief organizations?
Lawyers at a variety of levels - from the lone, young judge advo-
cate with the armored brigade that had penetrated deepest into Iraq,
to senior lawyers at CENTCOM, the Pentagon, and the Department
of State - worked feverishly to resolve these issues while providing
essential food, water, and medical care for these refugees until U.S.
forces withdrew from Iraq.
In the course of Desert Shield and Storm, the United States and
its British and French partners had captured 69,822 Iraqi prisoners
of war and retained personnel. 67 Their care and processing did not
cease with the announcement of a ceasefire, but would continue until
they had been repatriated. This work raised a number of questions
regarding practical implementation of the 1949 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). These issues
were addressed by lawyers working at each level of the chain of com-
66. Personal knowledge of the author, who conducted the briefings for the Human
Rights Watch official.
67. Appendix L, Conduct of the Gulf War, supra note 3.
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mand. Issues of interpretation were directed to lawyers in Washing-
ton only if they involved major policy issues. Two examples were as
follows:
Representatives of the ICRC requested of commanders of en-
emy prisoner of war camps a daily accounting, by name, of Iraqi
prisoners of war held in their facilities. While-Articles 122 and 123,
GPW, provide for a capturing power to provide such information to
the Central Tracing Agency of the ICRC, it was necessary to deter-
mine the correct meaning of those provisions.
The United States Army, in coordination with the ICRC prior
to the war, had established a new Prisoner of War Information Sys-
tem (PWIS) for expedited processing of enemy prisoners of war and
transmittal of the information required by Article 122, GPW, to the
National Prisoner of War Information Center in the Army Opera-
tions Center in the Pentagon. Because of difficulties in processing
vast numbers of prisoners, actual processing facilities, the principal
processing took place only once a prisoner of war reached Theater-
level camps located far from the front lines. The information col-
lected there in compliance with Article 122, GPW, was sent to the
National Prisoner of War Information Center.
Article 123, GPW, requires that such information be transmit-
ted to the Central Tracing Agency "as rapidly as possible." It was
determined that inasmuch as the Iraqi prisoners of war were being
held by the United States rather than by a particular camp com-
mander, the information requested would be transferred to the Cen-
tral Tracing Agency from the National Prisoner of War Information
Center rather than from individual camps. As it turned out, the
PWIS enabled the theater camps to transfer the information to the
National Prisoner of War Information Center expeditiously. Once
reconciled, the National Prisoner of War Information Center then
faxed the information directly to the Central Tracing Agency in Ge-
neva, within days of capture of an enemy soldier, rather than the
weeks and months that had been the experience in previous conflicts.
The process resulted in an almost perfect accuracy rate that is the
highest ever attained by any captor. An ICRC official meeting with
CENTCOM officers in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in April 1991 de-
clared that U.S. treatment of enemy prisoners of war "was the best
compliance with the [GPW] by any nation in any conflict in
history."68
68. Page L-l, Conduct of the Gulf War. In addition to accounting reasons, the U.S.
response to the ICRC request was based upon Article 12, GPW, which states that Prisoners of
war are in the hands of the enemy Power [i.e., nation], but not of the individuals or military
units who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the
Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them.
Inasmuch as the ultimate responsibility for the Iraqi prisoners of war rested upon the
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Also, there was interest of other humanitarian organizations in
the law of war. In the course of Desert Storm a request was received
from Human Rights Watch to permit its Middle East Watch to visit
U.S. prisoner of war camps. Military lawyers were consulted by pris-
oner of war camp authorities: Did the request have to be honored?
While the camp commanders were quite willing to open their camps
to necessary and appropriate inspection, their mission was to care for
the prisoners of war and retained personnel in their custody rather
than to conduct daily tours for each and every organization that felt
inclined 'to appoint itself as a guardian of prisoners of war in U.S.
care.
The response, coordinated between the author's office and the
Department of State, was clear: Article 9, GPW, authorizes a captor
to permit the ICRC "or any other impartial humanitarian organiza-
tion" to conduct their work, subject to the consent of the Parties to
the conflict concerned (in this case, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and
Iraq), while Article 125, GPW, states unequivocally that: "The De-
taining Power may limit the number of societies and organizations
whose delegates are allowed to carry out their activities in its terri-
tory and under its supervision . . . . The special position of the
[ICRC] in this field shall be recognized and respected at all
times."' 9 Inasmuch as the ICRC was carrying out its work within
the U.S. prisoner of war camps, there was no obligation to allow
representatives of Middle East Watch or any other self-appointed
"humanitarian" organization into U.S. prisoner of war camps. 0
IV. Post-conflict work
Legal issues did not end with the cessation of hostilities. Law-
yers supported commands actively involved in the reconstruction of
Kuwait, the repatriation of Iraqi prisoners of war, the disposal of
captured enemy equipment and supplies, the investigation of Iraqi
war crimes, and the recovery and disposition of enemy dead on the
battlefield. Because of Saddam Hussein's refusal to fully comply
with United Nations Security Council requirements to which he pre-
viously agreed, the maritime interception program continues as an
enforcement mechanism for the UN embargo.
Other issues also needed to be addressed. For example, first,
news stories reported the breaching of the Iraqi line of defense by
United States Government, it was felt that all reports to the Central Tracing Agency of the
ICRC perforce should come from Washington.
69. GPW, art. 125.
70. Personal knowledge of the author, who handled the request. The decision was influ-
enced as well by the fact that Human Rights Watch/Middle East Watch officials previously
had conceded their lack of knowlege of the law of war, and had requested special briefings in
order to educate themselves on the subject.
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the First Infantry Division, as well as the attack on Iraqi forces on
the so-called "highway of death." The reports suggested that each
involved some violation of the law of war. Lawyers worked with
press officials to clarify the facts in each case, and to explain that
neither was a violation of the law of war.
71
Second, in its funding of the Gulf War, Congress mandated that
the Department of Defeise would provide interim and final reports
on the conduct of the Gulf War to it.72 The interim report was sub-
mitted on July 15, 1991, while the final report was forwarded to
Congress on April 9, 1992.71 In addition to a complete section dis-
cussing the law of war issues identified by Congress that it wished
discussed, lawyers at the Washington and CENTCOM levels were
fully involved in the writing and review of the report as a whole.
Third, Iraqi threats or damage to the natural environment
brought to armed conflict a new level of potential destruction in war.
Following the Gulf War, questions were raised as to whether new
laws of war were required to address this problem. The international
environmental organization Greenpeace hosted a conference in
London in June 1991, to call for a "Fifth Geneva Convention," while
the Government of Canada and the Secretary General of the United
Nations hosted a conference of experts in Ottawa in July 1991 on
the same subject.74 The ICRC in turn hosted a like conference of
experts in Geneva April 19-27, 1992. The United States specifically
declined to send representatives to the Greenpeace meeting, but was
represented by international lawyers from the Department of State,
the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the author's office, thus
indicating the continuing role of lawyers.
V. Conclusion
As stated at the outset of this article, it was not the author's
71. The "highway of death" was one of the great misnomers of the war, as it involved
few Iraqi casualties. As journalist P.J. O'Rourke described the scene:
The killing field here was littered not so much with corpses as with TVs,
VCRs, Seiko watches, cartons of cigarettes, box lots of shampoo and hair condi-
tioner, cameras, videotapes and household appliances. School desks, tea sets,
stuffed animals, silverware, an accordiom and a Kuwaiti family's photo album
were all being dragged back to Iraq. I saw a pickup truck full of women's ball
gowns and another truck stacked with Pampers. A hot-wired camper van sat
with two cans of club soda resting in the dish-mounted drink gimbals. The
camper bunks were filled with men's boxer shorts, the price tags still on them
... . What we had here was the My Lai of consumer goods ....
P. J. O'Rourke, Hoo-Ah!, ROLLING STONE, MAY 2. 1991, at 40, 63. The breaching of the
Iraqi defense line and the "highway of death" issue are discussed at 0-32 to 0-35, Conduct of
the Gulf War, supra note 3.
72. Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Ben-
efits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25).
73. Conduct of the Gulf War, supra note 3.




intention to offer a complete, comprehensive discussion and analysis
of all of the legal issues surrounding the 1990-1991 Gulf War for the
liberation of Kuwait. Such an article would require a book-length
publication.
The law of war before Desert Shield and Desert Storm often
was looked upon as an esoteric, academic subject of little practical
value. Changes initiated by the armed services of the United States
in the post-Vietnam era recognized its importance and the impor-
tance of the lawyer in working with his client in this area, not only
to assist the client in discharging his legal obligations (while counsel-
ing him of his rights), but also in fighting in the politically-charged
environment of warfare today.
It is clear that in a media-intense conflict like that experienced
in the Gulf War, law of war issues - including allegations of viola-
tion of the law of war - will loom large in determining domestic
and international public support for the war effort. Fighting war
under a microscope will continue to challenge the military com-
mander. The role of the lawyer developed as part of the concept of
operational law was intended to provide the battlefield commander
with the same quality legal services a civilian client would expect
from an attorney or law firm in the private sector. The degree to
which law of war issues played in the execution and accomplishment
of Desert Shield and Desert Storm proved the wisdom of that deci-
sion. The degree to which commanders and senior policymaking offi-
cials turned to their lawyers for advice and assistance was testimony
to the value of the lawyer to the client.
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